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14. ABSTRACT Due to substantial shortcomings in doctrine and organization, the United States military is challenged with successfully executing counter insurgency (CI) operations in Iraq. This paper argues that COCOMs do not frame and ask the correct questions when facing an insurgency mission, despite historical CI successes upon which to base such questions. They fail to employ all the elements of national power through judicious use of "carrots" and "sticks" in coercing host nations plagued by insurgency to acquiesce to U.S. guidance. United States counter insurgency successes in the Philippines (1946-1955) and El Salvador (1981-1991) are ignored as well as other nation's successes in CI operations. A framework of 12 questions that assist the COCOM in determining the exact nature of the insurgency and how to best employ all available carrots and sticks can overcome the institutional and historical challenges U.S. forces face in winning counter insurgencies.

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CARROTS AND STICKS: QUESTIONS FOR COCOMS WHO MUST LEVERAGE NATIONAL POWER IN COUNTER INSURGENCY WARFARE

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09 February 2004

Abstract

CARROTS AND STICKS: QUESTIONS FOR COCOMS WHO MUST LEVERAGE NATIONAL POWER IN COUNTER

INSURGENCY WARFARE

Due to substantial shortcomings in doctrine and organization, the United States military is challenged with successfully executing counter insurgency (CI) operations in Iraq. More importantly, the U.S. failure in Vietnam has handicapped current military leaders with an understanding and appreciation of the complexity of counter insurgency warfare. This paper argues that COCOMs do not frame and ask the correct questions when facing an insurgency mission, despite historical CI successes upon which to base such questions.

COCOMs rely too heavily on overt use of U.S. conventional forces in prosecuting counter insurgency warfare. They fail to employ all the elements of national power through judicious use of "carrots" and "sticks" in coercing host nations plagued by insurgency to acquiesce to U.S. guidance. United States counter insurgency successes in the Philippines (1946-1955) and El Salvador (1981-1991) are ignored as well as other nation's successes in CI operations.

A framework of 12 questions that assist the COCOM in determining the exact nature of the insurgency and how best to employ all available carrots and sticks can overcome the institutional and historical challenges U.S. forces face in winning counter insurgencies. Consideration of the best employment of U.S. carrots and sticks will help the COCOM avoid the pitfalls of traditional U.S. military methods of employment in a form of conflict that will challenge the United States for years to come.

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A: Definitions and Abbreviations

Introduction

  The United States is currently involved in a difficult insurgency in Iraq that is creating substantial challenges due to both the advantages and limitations of the American way of war. The American way of war involves: technological dominance; massive firepower; a quick, decisive victory against the enemy; and avoidance of unnecessary loss of American lives. These attributes are not compatible with a type of warfare that is by nature protracted, evasive, and yields no stunning victories. Counter insurgency (CI) warfare also goes against the grain of the U.S. conventional military for doctrinal and organizational reasons. Doctrinally, the United States military believes military and political factors should be separated; however, this is a fundamental combination that must be jointly addressed in CI. Organizationally, the big-unit, technologically dependent American military loses its massed power advantage in a war focused on the human element.

  Historically, military leaders have not asked the correct questions in deriving successful strategies to counter insurgency warfare. The American military failure in Vietnam is a classic example of focusing on conventional military solutions without addressing the root cause of a politically and culturally centered war. These same mistakes are made today as American combatant commanders (COCOMs) rely primarily on conventional military options rather than judicious employment of all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) against insurgencies. Therefore, this paper argues that COCOMs do not frame and ask the correct questions when facing an insurgency mission, despite historical CI successes upon which to base such questions.

  Counter insurgency warfare demands a delicate combination of all elements of national power. Rather than automatically choosing overt use of conventional military power, COCOMs should consider crafting a CI strategy based on a framework of questions that leverage U.S. "carrots" and "sticks" to force the host nation government (HNG) to solve its own insurgent problem. "Carrots" consist of offering American economic, political, and information aid to improve the legitimacy of the HNG. "Sticks" include military assistance via equipment and advisors, as well as the threat to withdraw any (particularly economic) or all of the carrots if the HNG resists U.S. advice. Successful U.S. counter insurgency strategies, as case studies in this paper will demonstrate, rely less on U.S. military presence and more on transparent U.S. military aid coupled with appreciation of cultural differences, in the context of judicious economic, political, and informational assistance to the sovereign government.

  Following a brief discussion of insurgency background and theory, this paper analyzes two U.S. counter insurgency success stories to illustrate how U.S. and foreign leaders correctly considered options and formulated strategies to defeat the insurgents. These two U.S. counter insurgencies address operations in the Philippines (1946-1955) and El Salvador (1981-1991). While analysis of these operations may not be directly applicable to current U.S. operations in Iraq, the intention is not to provide a cookie cutter framework to apply to all counter insurgency warfare. Rather, the case study analysis objective is to create a list of focused questions that combatant commanders should employ to ensure the nature of the current insurgency is understood, U.S. limitations are recognized, and to assist in creation of realistic courses of action for COCOM consideration.

Background

Small wars are conceived in uncertainty…conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.
-Marine Corps Small Wars Manual

Insurgency is not a new form of warfare. It has existed since Biblical times when Jewish insurgents fought Roman legions in Judea. Many former colonial powers have faced insurgencies throughout history. The French failed to maintain control over Algeria and South East Asia due to insurgent movements. The British met with success in Malaya, but also failure in Cyprus and Palestine. The United States traces its beginning back to an insurgent war waged against Great Britain. U.S. experiences in small wars and insurgencies span the globe from China, the Philippines, Latin America, Cuba, and the Caribbean. However, the only military manual that captures these valuable experiences, the U.S. Marine Corps <u>Small Wars Manual</u>, has remained largely neglected over time.[1] Modern studies of foreign successes in small wars and insurgencies, such as the British in Malaya and Arabians against the Turks in World War I, also remain largely ignored.

The United States supported both insurgencies and counter insurgencies with a decent track record of success in the 20th century. However, the U.S. failure in Vietnam appears to dominate all insurgency considerations for contemporary military leaders and planners. The elimination of Soviet-sponsored third world insurrection allows today's COCOMs to focus upon and isolate the true nature of revolutionary movements. However, a generation of U.S. officers has failed to study insurgency warfare because of "No more Vietnams," cessation of what we thought would be the next big war (Cold War), and the assumption that as a hyper-power, we would never engage in insurgent type warfare. Only U.S. special operations forces (SOF) maintain a consistent capability in this context.

The U.S. military is reluctant to modify big-ticket, conventional combat investment for temporary, low yield brush wars.[2] Keys to U.S. success in CI are security, training, and advisory assistance. Keys to winning popular support are psychological operations, civic actions, and grass roots human intelligence work that do not mesh well with conventional U.S. concepts of war.[3]

Important to understanding counter insurgencies is a brief discussion of the various terminologies used and how insurgency warfare is addressed in joint doctrine. The many terms that describe insurgency warfare are used both correctly and incorrectly. Terms such as revolutionary warfare, guerilla warfare, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, and small wars, all confuse the precise use of the term insurgency. Insurgency warfare falls under foreign internal defense (FID) as part of military operations other than war (MOOTW) in Joint Publication (JP) 3.07.1. As defined in Joint Publication 1-02, an insurgency is: "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." (See Appendix A for complete definitions of related military operations.) The difference between insurgent and guerilla is the most important difference to note. An insurgent may use guerilla (also known as unconventional) or conventional warfare to achieve social or political change. A guerilla is an UW combatant whose primary motives are military. A definition helpful in discussion of insurgencies is:

> "Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity – including guerilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and

international activity – is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy."[4]

That the United States lacks detailed joint counter insurgency doctrine was commented on by LTC Brian Manthe. He discussed how trained U.S. conventional forces can execute CI missions traditionally tasked to SOF. He also indicated that a lack of doctrinal joining exists between SOF and conventional forces in conducting CI operations. Finally, he recognized the absence of joint doctrine to guide conventional forces in assisting SOF in CI warfare.[5]

Insurgency Theory

The strategy and the tactics of insurgency will not change greatly, even though the political implications are unpredictable and the weapons of the insurgents may become increasingly sophisticated. It is important therefore that the lessons of the past should not be forgotten or ignored, but should be applied to the future.
-Julian Paget

Essential to understanding counter insurgency warfare are the cause, requirements, and strategies of insurgents. Basic causes of insurgencies include population pressures for government change, a deep perception of inequality, and unresolved religious or ethnic problems.[6] Other causes may include: a weak national administration; lack of political infrastructure; disenfranchisement; corruption and mismanagement; difficult civil-military relationships; the mal-distribution of resources; and social divisions.[7] Pre-conditions for the emergence of insurgent movements are a cause for hostility towards the government, a discontented elite that can organize anti-government movement, and some measure of popular support.[8] Insurgencies must have: charismatic leaders, attainable goals, motivating ideology, and access to internal or external resources.[9] As MG Edward Lansdale, an expert of U.S. CI in the Philippines and Vietnam, stated: "An insurgency depends upon its leadership, about which there is always more to learn."[10] Another respected CI authority on British CI strategy in Malaya, Julian Paget, cites the following requirements for successful insurgencies: support of local population, bases, mobility, supplies and information, and the will to win.[11]

The insurgent possesses certain advantages. He usually has the initiative, and a good idea of when and where to strike. Phases that may be considered for insurgent operations are: (1) creation of a political party; (2) building of a united front; (3) guerilla warfare; (4) movement warfare; and (5) annihilation warfare.[12] Insurgent strategy must address popular support, organization, external support, the environment, and the government response.

Two of four major insurgency models are addressed in this paper. The Leninist model is based on small scale, highly disciplined, and largely political organizations. This model depends on selected popular support and assumption of a weak government as seen in the Philippine case study. The El Salvador case study demonstrates the Cuban model. This includes a limited organization, usually military, which later spawns the party, and assumes a weak government.[13]

Two key studies of CI strategies are a 1984 U.S. government technical report offering 14 points of analysis for counter insurgency, and a RAND corporation study on U.S. Army recommendations for fighting counter insurgencies. The technical report addresses key considerations such as psychological operations and programs to improve rural conditions.[14] The RAND study recognizes that the insurgent threat may pose different priorities to U.S. and third world governments. The third world government

may place a higher priority on keeping power, amassing personal wealth, and enjoying life in its major cities. Also, it may feel that any insurgency problem that earns U.S. interest will result in a U.S. resourced solution.[15]

Historical case study analysis reveals excellent considerations for developing the questions to ask when crafting CI strategy. The most important lessons from these case studies concern how the United States employed "carrots and sticks" to influence HNGs and defeat insurgents.

The United States in the Philippines, 1946-1955

If we are to succeed, impatient Americans will have to remember our own heritage. …People's wars are not for fighters with short attention spans.
-Edward Lansdale

CI in the Philippines began after the end of World War II. The Hukbalahap (or "Huks" meaning "anti-Japanese Army") was a Luzon based communist organization that desired the overthrow of the Philippine government due to its inability to meet the needs of the Philippine people. The Huk insurgency was a peasant rebellion that followed a Leninist model with nominal communist leadership, and depended on popular support to exist and grow. The source of the conflict was radical changes in farming that disrupted the traditional, benevolent relationship between land owners and workers in favor of a profit motivated, capitalist system. This caused social upheaval and marginalization of the peasants due to government failure to address the situation.[16]

U.S. policy in the Philippines was largely to ignore the Huk problem due to U.S. preoccupation with the Korean War. However, once the insurgent source was identified as communist and the Cold War geo-strategic importance of the Philippines recognized, greater U.S. attention was applied. The United States desired to apply minimal financial and military assets to address the Huk insurgency. As will be shown, the inability to send US troops became a great benefit to U.S. strategy in the conflict. Though few resources were applied, the United States did dispatch Air Force Colonel (later Major General) Edward Lansdale to lead what would today be considered a Joint Task Force with a largely foreign internal defense (FID) mission.

As the head of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines, Lansdale was surprised during initial briefings at the attention paid to the Huk military capability rather than social, political, and economic causes of the insurgency. Lansdale understood his military and fiscal limitations. JUSMAG never exceeded 40 personnel with a total budget of $500 million from 1951-1955. In comparison, Vietnam absorbed a United States cost of $1 billion a month for the last 6 years.[17] Lansdale created a carrot and stick strategy that forced the Government of the Philippines (GOP) to find a solution to its problem. JUSMAG policies kept U.S. involvement strictly to an advisory role. This ensured that the GOP received the credit for all CI successes, thus maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Lansdale and his staff used their limited funds and unlimited surplus military hardware to great effect in influencing GOP actions. Most importantly, Lansdale formed a strong bond with the new Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay.[18]

Magsaysay instituted a vast reorganization of Filipino military forces to address the Huk insurgency. Smaller, better trained units systematically and actively patrolled and cleared remote zones, establishing a continuous presence with the local population. Huk

leader Luis Taruc admitted after his surrender that, "small hunter-killer teams that went into and stayed in the jungle were more effective than ponderous, multi-battalion-sized sweeps."[19] With Lansdale's support, Magsaysay instituted a psychological warfare plan with emphasis on timely operations driven by accurate intelligence. As Lansdale stated in his biography: "the strategy of directing psychological blows at an enemy's leadership in a political war is hardly new. It is a fundamental necessity in such warfare."[20] Magsaysay implemented professionalization of the Filipino military. He forced the government to reform land management, created civic action improvement programs, and encouraged popular participation in government. By addressing the peasants' needs and offering a better future than that promised by the Huks, he undercut the popular support the insurgents required.

United States success in the Philippines insurgency was reached through astute understanding of the exact nature of the war. Lansdale could have pressed for a greater U.S. military presence to take over the fight, but recognized the tools at hand were adequate to the nature of the conflict. Judicious use of all elements of national power, recognition of the insurgent center of gravity, and application of U.S. assets to influence the GOP's CI strategy were factors of success and essential lessons for crafting modern-day questions to assist the COCOM.

The United States in El Salvador, 1981-1991

The United States began to assist the government of El Salvador (GOES) with its insurgency challenge in 1979 when the communist Sandinistas took control of neighboring Nicaragua. In a desire to avoid any further spread of communism in Latin America, but influenced by the ubiquitous presence of CI failure in Vietnam, the United States made an early decision to deploy very few assets. No more than 55 U.S. advisors were ever in El Salvador at one time.[21] The policy resulted from U.S. understanding that one of its greatest problems in South East Asia had been too-close relations with the Vietnamese government. These relations marginalized U.S. ability to reform its corrupt client. Essentially, the United States wrote a blank check for economic and military support. As Korea limited the U.S. military presence in the Philippines, Vietnam would limit forces deployed to El Salvador. The United States relied on the economic carrot to force the HNG to address its own security issues.

The GOES insurgent enemy was an organization called the FMLN.[22] Utilizing the Cuban model of insurgency, the FMLN was a guerilla organization striving for both legitimacy and popular support from the Salvadoran people. The Salvadorans labored under a repressive government that ignored human rights, mass unemployment, vital services, and paid scant attention to agrarian reform. The center of gravity in this conflict, as in the Philippines, was correctly identified as the popular support of the Salvadoran people.

As U.S. carrots and sticks were applied and leveraged against the GOES, reform was instituted in the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF). The ESAF were transformed from an 11-14,000 man praetorian guard abusive of the population, to a 50-55,000 man Army able to defeat the insurgents.[23] Further, the ESAF was transformed from a conventionally trained force overly preoccupied with its last war with Honduras, to a UW force that combined small unit operations, intelligence, civic action, psychological operations, protection of economic infrastructure, and winning the support of the population.[24]

Following GOES military reform, the United States recommended and forced a national campaign for reconstruction targeted on specific departments to include reform of land, banking, and commodity marketing. ESAF units conducted aggressive, surgical offensive operations while maintaining a presence in "cleared" regions, and respecting the rights of locals and civic action programs. Greater emphasis was placed on establishment of a popular government that garnered support through legitimate interests in population welfare, rather than deployment of technologically driven, massive units to defeat small insurgent forces. The threat of cutting off U.S. security assistance to the ESAF was used as leverage to force disbanding of plain clothes, police units committing human rights violations.[25] If ESAF corruption incidents, threats or challenges against elected civilian leaders, or human rights violations increased – funds were decreased; if FMLN military actions or demonstrations seemed to increase – funds were increased. As stated by the military advisory group commander, Colonel John Waghelstein, "critical terrain in insurgency warfare is the beliefs of the people."[26]

As CI operations in El Salvador revealed, CI warfare does not yield "single cataclysmic military events." Progress occurred in small increments over time. CI warfare is protracted in nature and demands long term expenditure of public support to win. The lesson learned from CI operations in El Salvador is that the goal of an insurgent is not military, but politically motivated to undermine government legitimacy. Winning of popular support through civic actions, while tailoring host nation forces to fight small unit warfare as in the Philippines, was demonstrated in this conflict. The United States executed a successful CI campaign through: expansion, reorganization, and rethinking of ESAF military roles; forcing the GOES to address the root causes of discontent; careful application of programs to address causes of the insurgency; and mobilization of human and material resources. Simply focusing on the destruction of FMLN forces would not have defeated the insurgency war in El Salvador. Thus, conflict assists in creating the following 12 key questions that address the nature of counter insurgency warfare.

12 Questions for COCOM Consideration

> To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
> -Sun Tzu

The essential beginning for creating courses of action is that the COCOM assesses accurately the nature and characteristics of host governments. The COCOM must decide what U.S. interests exist in the region in order to develop a formula to assist the host nation government and defeat the insurgents. Determination of the importance of the conflict to U.S. interests, the availability of U.S. national power to be applied, guidance from the National Security Council, and precise determination of the needs and motivation of the HNG to solve its own problems are essential when creating a CI framework for COCOM consideration. Thus the following 12 questions are offered to assist the COCOM in best employing all available ways and means (carrots and sticks) in creating a viable CI strategy:

1. Is there a legitimate government or individual in charge who I can assist or support? An obvious, though not always available, asset for this consideration is the prominent HNG figure, such as Ramon Magsaysay, who supports U.S. involvement and interests and will provide a bridge for the cultural gap.

2. How important is U.S. involvement? This requires the early recognition that despite our best altruistic intentions, we are not capable of "fixing" every situation. The United States identified its relevant strategic interests in both the Philippines and El Salvador due to Cold War considerations. However, the United States limited the operational ways and means of achieving its strategic ends.

3. What does the insurgent want? Essential to determining the enemy center of gravity is to identify the center or true nature of this conflict. Both the Huks and FMLN depended on government weakness to achieve their political agendas. Answers may include: politics, religion, economy, ethnicity, ideology, or a combination of all. Important in this evaluation is impressing upon the host nation that the United States has an appreciation of local culture and custom. Includes in this question is: what is an accurate description of the insurgency (secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, etc.)?[27]

4. Where does the insurgent get support? Enemy intentions must be evaluated based on availability of internal or external support, or recognition by a foreign power. The Huks utilized surplus military supplies from World War II, which eventually evaporated. The FMLN received external support from Nicaragua. Also, critical factors that may help in identification of the enemy center of gravity must be determined (e.g., global network, combat forces, access to arms, sanctuaries, financing, or the ideological message sent to the masses).

5. To what level does the insurgency receive popular support? A further consideration is whether support is given out of fear or love. By forcing the HNG to address the needs of the people, the COCOM can begin to starve the insurgents of much needed popular support as seen in both case studies. Once popular support of the Huks and FMLN was minimized, neither insurgent organization presented a viable threat to the government.

6. What carrots and sticks do I have available? This is a crucial evaluation in the COCOM's estimate that includes: U.S. long term popular support for the conflict; U.S. military (conventional and unconventional forces) availability and, more importantly, the total use of the HNG's military forces; economic resources; information and psychological warfare employment of the awesome U.S. marketing ability to convey anti-insurgent message to the population; diplomatic tools to get the HNG to help itself; time available; U.S. idea of legitimate government versus the insurgents ideas (and is it better?); and finally, how to organize these assets, as the two case studies demonstrate, to ensure maximum effectiveness?

7. What is the best combination of available carrots and sticks to support the legitimate government? This consideration necessitates searching for relevant historical examples to assist the COCOM in avoiding overuse of military options in a political war. CI operations in El Salvador and the Philippines do not provide relevant solutions to all counter insurgencies.

8. What are limitations to the carrots and sticks? This is a reminder of legal and moral limits, assistance in developing rules of engagement, and assurance that both the United States and host nation maintain the ethical high ground with respect to human rights. In both case studies, U.S. military assistance groups made human rights reform of abusive HNG forces an essential task to restore HNG legitimacy.

9. How do I protect my center of gravity? Many U.S. enemies see Vietnam as the greatest example of U.S. defeat, and conclude that the American public lacks the necessary fortitude in a protracted war. These enemies will utilize the media as a weapon to reach domestic American opinion and will to support U.S. actions. As shown in El Salvador and the Philippines, a minimal U.S. presence limits opportunities for insurgents to attack American centers of gravity.

10. How does U.S. democracy translate to the host nation (HN) culture? Not all struggling nations are culturally prepared for the American model of democracy. Therefore, it is crucial to determine HN popular willingness to accept fairly elected citizen leaders. Also, the case studies illustrate that the HN military must be trained and prepared to follow civilian leaders for the long term benefit of the people.

11. How do I remove the "U.S." label and insert the country label? As historical cases have shown, the sooner we convince governments plagued by insurgency to solve their own problems with U.S. advice, and measured economic and military assistance, the greater control we have over solving the situation quickly. COCOMs must ensure the United States is perceived as an ally and liberator rather than an occupier or conqueror. Every COCOM decision in supporting the host government must be oriented toward building and reinforcing the legitimacy of incumbent regime.

12. Is this counter-insurgency winnable within my limitations? Finally, the COCOM must honestly assess if the previous answers yield a result that is winnable. In an insurgency, victory does not usually result in the unconditional surrender of the enemy, but rather a negotiated peace, vastly reduced threat to the sovereign government, or simply survival of that government. Again, the COCOM must be convinced the United States will remain in the effort for as long as it takes to win.

Summary - Does this Apply to *Operation Iraqi Freedom*?

> There are only two powers in the world…the sword and the spirit. In the long run, the sword is always defeated by the spirit…
> -Napoleon Bonaparte

The shadow of previous wars always affects the next war. The U.S. insurgency warfare experience demonstrates how small successes are quickly forgotten and singular failure dominates future decisions. The extraordinary success in *Operation Desert Storm* and *Operation Enduring Freedom* plagues U.S. operations in Iraq because they suggest to Americans that the U.S. military can safely employ troops overseas and keep casualties low. Though the United States has stated it has an open commitment in Iraq, how long will the American people tolerate continuing U.S. casualties?

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is not a classic counter insurgency case, but rather an extension of operations against the Baathist Iraqi regime. Current U.S. counter insurgency operations in Iraq are a transition from conventional to unconventional operations, rather than rendering assistance to an existing government in fighting an insurgent belligerent. The U.S. challenge in Iraq, in contrast to previous counter insurgencies, is that there is no existing government. Also, the United States has failed to evaluate and understand the cultural centers of powers within Iraq. U.S. strategy appears to have divided the country on a strictly religious basis (Sunnis, Shi'ias, and Kurds). CI strategy within Iraq has failed to recognize the importance of both religious and tribal affiliations in creating a viable plan to quell the insurgents.

Although *OIF* is not classic CI, the questions developed in this paper can and should assist the CENTCOM commander in ensuring all relevant considerations are addressed. Though the CENTCOM commander has yet to find a Ramon Magsaysay who agrees with U.S. interests in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority is attempting to transition into power a democratic Iraqi government. Question #10 seems most apt in asking, "is Iraq ready for democracy?" Further, is a country split on both religious and tribal lines able to execute some form of democracy? The answer is to allow the Iraqis to develop their own version of democracy with U.S. advice and assistance. Though an Iraqi Constitution may not develop on the same lines as the 1787 U.S. Constitution, it is an important first step to achieving Iraqi national democracy.

U.S. strategy to distant U.S. military forces quickly from the conflict must not be done so hastily that Iraq is thrown into chaos. At the same time, removing the "U.S." label sooner rather than later empowers the legitimacy of U.S. actions to give Iraq back to the Iraqis. Clearly, coalition forces already employ money as a carrot to win the support of the Iraqi people, but money alone will not cease insurgent activities. Answering questions #3, #4 and #5 assist in determining the nature of the insurgent threat. The insurgents appear to be former Baathist regime supporters who wish to bring back a strongly dominant Sunni government. U.S. strategy must continue to starve the insurgents of necessary support through continuing civic actions programs. CENTCOM must not allow the insurgency to continue, cutting off any external support of men or material. The United States must also continue to build legitimacy for its actions by restoring quickly an Iraqi military and police force that can assist in fighting the insurgents and defending the country. However, all such actions require time. Thus, the United States government must continue to communicate daily successes to the American public. Media coverage of the latest U.S. casualties must be balanced by restoration of Iraqi infrastructure and human interest stories that cover the need Iraqis have at the grass roots level for the United States to remain and complete its commitment.

In the case of *OIF*, an additional consideration is made in how to measure progress? The more visible a conflict is to the American public, the more important progress must be demonstrated. This is challenging in an insurgency. Some system of metrics for progress to interpret success to the American public must be developed in order to secure continued support. Due to both their lack of media notoriety and U.S. forces involved, a system of incremental successes that could be portrayed to the American public was unnecessary in either case study. However, due to the obvious notoriety of *OIF* to the U.S., incremental success is crucial to continued American support.

With incremental success considered, the historical cases and evaluation of the American Way of War offer a framework of questions to assist the combatant commander in engaging successfully counter insurgency warfare. Consideration of the best employment of U.S. carrots and sticks will help the COCOM avoid the pitfalls of traditional U.S. military methods of employment in a form of conflict that will challenge the United States for years to come.

<u>NOTES</u>

[1] Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. <u>Small Wars Manual</u>. (Reprint of 1940 edition), NAVMC 2890. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987).

The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual is a compilation of lessons learned in small wars from end of 19th century until 1934. It largely focuses on the tactical level and when revolution has already started. It predominantly addresses protection of US personnel, property, and interests. The phases of Marine Corps CI Ops from the manual are:

1. Build up of Marine forces
2. Field Operations
3. Development of native "constabulary" forces
4. Preparation and execution of "free and fair" elections
5. Marine forces withdrawal and redeployment.

Its greatest strength is the emphasis on close political control and restraints on military tactics and operations. Marine forces in the manual are sometimes referred to as "state department troops." It also emphasizes thorough consideration of military actions in reference to impact on both American public opinion and foreign support and the detailed study of natives, customs, racial qualities, psychology and local history. The manual recommends avoidance of civilian resettlement into camps unless an absolute military necessity. Though there are many contradictions within manual, the timeless lessons it offers were lost to generations of officers who focused on big, conventional wars.

[2] Ernest Evans. <u>Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio</u>. (Edited by Howard J. Wiarda. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984), 186-187.

[3] John D. Waghelstein. "Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Post-Vietnam Era." <u>The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies and Implications for Future Conflicts</u>. (Edited by Grinter, Lawrence E. and Dunn, Peter M. Contributions in Military Studies (Number 67), 1998), 132.

[4] Stephen T Hosmer. <u>The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency</u>. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990).

The Rand Insurgency definition further goes on to state: "The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country."

[5] LTC Brian Manthe. "United States Military Doctrine and the Conduct of Counter-Insurgency." (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2001), 2-9.

[6] Anthony J. Joes. <u>Modern Guerilla Insurgency</u>. (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1992), 1.

[7] John R. Galvin. "Conflict in the Post Cold War Era," in <u>Low-Intensity Conflict</u>, ed. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Slodan. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 16.

[8] Andrew M. Scott. <u>Insurgency</u>. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 16.

[9] V.K. Annand. <u>Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency</u>. (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1981), 63-91.

[10] Edward G. Lansdale. <u>In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia</u>. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 376.

[11] Julian Paget. <u>Counter-Insurgency Operations</u>. (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 156-157.

[12] David Galula. <u>Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice</u>. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 44-58.

[13] Bard E. O'Neill. "Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis," in <u>American Defense Policy,</u> edited by John F. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 164-172.

Maoist and urban terrorism are two other forms of insurgency. The Maoist approach utilizes mass popular support, and extensive political and military organization. It assumes government superiority from the outset. Urban terrorism includes a limited organization of terrorist cells in cities and limited popular support followed by eventual transferal to rural areas with presumably the adoption of either a Maoist or Cuban strategy.

[14] Douglas Blauforb and Dr. George K. Tanham. <u>Fourteen Points: A Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency</u>. Technical Report for the US government. (BDM Corporation: 1984), Annex IN 2-IN-3.

Douglass Blaufarb and Dr. George Tanham describe an insurgency as an organized attempt to overthrow an existing regime by armed attack persisting over an extended period. Their 14 point framework evaluated in detail nine 20th century insurgencies based on the following counterinsurgency activities (for incumbent government/security forces):

1. military leadership
2. unconventional tactics and strategy
3. competent military intelligence
4. discipline, behavior and military civic action
5. air and naval operations
6. civil-military relations
7. est. of a popular militia
8. police operations
9. intelligence operations
10. psychological operations
11. unified management of counterinsurgency activity
12. the political framework
13. programs to improve rural conditions and administration
14. the legal framework

[15] Stephen T. Hosmer. The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), 12-13.
Additional recommendations from RAND author Stephen Hosmer for US Army fighting insurgencies include:
-Build and maintain small cadre of CI experts to advise and train indigenous forces:
- Ensure effective US arms and equipment transfers to countries facing insurgent threats"
-A general lack of US experience in CI, lack of preparation of US advisors in language, culture, and military specialization in CI operations (18)
-A lack of training background – nothing at JRTC to train CI as it is a prolonged (more than weeks or months) fight
-Failure to screen the "right" officer/NCO for CI operations.

[16] Wray R. Johnson and Paul J. Dimech. "Foreign Internal Defense and the Hukbalahap: Model Counter-Insurgency." Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol. 4, No. 1, (Spring/Summer 1993), 33-35.

[17] Lansdale, 18.

[18] Ibid., 19.

[19] John D. Waghelstein. "Ruminations of a Pachyderm Or What I Learned In the Counter-Insurgency Business." Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol.5, No.3, (Winter 1994), 365.

[20] Lansdale, 375.

[21] John D. Waghelstein. "Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal Observations – the El Salvador Case." Unpublished paper. (Fall 2002), 7.

[22] Ibid., 38. The organization was called the *frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN) and named after a Salvadoran communist (Agustin Farabundo Marti) who fought with Nicaraguan guerillas against U.S. forces (1928-1934).

[23] Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, "A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador." Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol. 4. No. 1, (Spring/Summer 1993), 60.

[24] Waghelstein, 2002, 16.

[25] Ibid., 24.

[26] Ibid., 12.

[27] Bard E. O'Neill. "Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis," in American Defense Policy, edited by John F. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 163.
O'Neill discussed six types of insurgent motivations that are useful for COCOM consideration: (1) Secessionist = goal to leave the existing political community and reconstitute a new one and targets political community; (2) Revolutionary = goal to establish new political values and structures and targets regime and authorities (Vietnam is a prime example); (3) Restorational = restore political values and structures of the recent past (WW II French resistance against Nazis, and Iraqi insurgents against US); (4) Reactionary = goal to reestablish political values and structures of and idealized distant past (groups in Middle East who seek to recreate the flowering Islamic society of centuries ago); (5) Conservative = goal is retention of existing political values and structures

(Protestant Irish fight against Catholics to retain their regime in Northern Ireland); and (6) Reformist = goal is to change the political and economic power distribution (such as Kurds in Iraq attempting greater representation against Sadaam Hussain's regime).

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　　　Insurgency Business." <u>Small Wars & Insurgencies</u>, Vol.5, No.3, Winter 1994, 360-378.

<div align="center">Appendix A: <u>Definitions and Abbreviations</u></div>

<u>Definitions</u>

<u>Counter-Insurgency.</u> Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02).

<u>Foreign Internal Defense.</u> Political, economic, informational and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. (JP 1-02).

<u>Guerilla Warfare.</u> Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 1-02). Guerilla is the Spanish term for "little."

<u>Insurgency.</u> An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02).

<u>Low Intensity Conflict.</u> …below conventional war and above the routine, … ranges from subversion to the use of armed forces. ….waged by a combination of means … contain certain regional and global security implications… (JP 1-02).

<u>Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).</u> Operations that encompass the USCC of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complements any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war. (JP 1-02).

<u>Revolutionary Warfare</u>. No Joint definition exists. However, Bernard Fall offers a definition of, "…the overthrowing of the government established in a given country and its replacement by another regime…thanks to the active participation of the population, conquered physically and morally by simultaneously destructive and constructive processes, according to precisely-developed techniques." (Fall, 371).

<u>Terrorism.</u> Numerous definitions exist, both private and government. For this, I will use the Department of Defense definition: Unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

<u>Unconventional Warfare</u>. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerilla warfare, and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversions, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-02).

Abbreviations

CI	Counter-Insurgency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
JP	Joint Publication
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
UW	Unconventional Warfare